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Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae (CRE), a group of pathogens resistant to most antibiotics and asso-
ciated with high mortality, are a rising emerging public health threat. Current approaches to infection control and
prevention have not been adequate to prevent spread. An important but unproven approach is to have hospitals
in a region coordinate surveillance and infection control measures. Using our Regional Healthcare Ecosystem An-
alyst (RHEA) simulation model and detailed Orange County, California, patient-level data on adult inpatient hospital
and nursing home admissions (2011–2012), we simulated the spread of CRE throughout Orange County health-
care facilities under 3 scenarios: no specific control measures, facility-level infection control efforts (uncoordinated
control measures), and a coordinated regional effort. Aggressive uncoordinated and coordinated approaches were
highly similar, averting 2,976 and 2,789 CRE transmission events, respectively (72.2% and 77.0% of transmission
events), by year 5. With moderate control measures, coordinated regional control resulted in 21.3% more averted
cases (n = 408) than did uncoordinated control at year 5. Our model suggests that without increased infection con-
trol approaches, CRE would become endemic in nearly all Orange County health-care facilities within 10 years.
While implementing the interventions in the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s CRE toolkit would not
completely stop the spread of CRE, it would cut its spread substantially, by half.
carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae; control measures; coordinated responses; regional spread;
surveillance
Abbreviations: CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; CRE, carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae; LTAC,
long-term acute-care hospital; MRSA, methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus; RHEA, Regional Healthcare Ecosystem
Analyst.
Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae (CRE) are con-
sidered an urgent public health threat by the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) (1). Few treatment
options exist for CRE infection, which can result in high mor-
tality. The emergence of CRE across the United States has
suggested that existing approaches to infection control and
prevention may not be adequate to control the spread of CRE.
CRE have been steadily increasing in prevalence over the
past decade in many US regions. In 2011, 4.2% of Entero-
bacteriaceae were CRE, up from the 1.2% reported in 2001
(2, 3). CRE detection increased more than 5-fold between
2008 and 2012 (4). Within the ﬁrst 6 months of 2012, 3.9%
of acute-care hospitals and 17.8% of long-term acute-care
hospitals (LTACs) reported at least 1 CRE infection (2). Ad-
ditionally, as of January 2015, CRE has been conﬁrmed in 48
states (5). These data strongly suggest that CRE will even-
tually become widespread if new tactics in controlling the
spread of CRE are not adopted.
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Some regions of the United States have experienced a par-
ticularly high burden or rapid spread of CRE (6). In regions
with high CRE burden, the CDC has recommended (i.e., in
the 2012 CRE toolkit) that health-care facilities in the region
coordinate CRE surveillance and control measures (7). Previ-
ous studies have demonstrated the beneﬁts of regional coor-
dination of control measures for endemic pathogens such as
methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) and
vancomycin-resistant enterococci (8–10). However, the dy-
namics of emerging pathogens are different from those of en-
demic pathogens, and CRE have speciﬁc characteristics that
may mean that their patterns of spread are different in varying
scenarios and settings, which leads to several key questions.
First, if current trends persist, what will CRE prevalence in
health-care facilities be in the coming years? Second, will ex-
isting approaches be adequate (i.e., each health-care facility
acting independently in CRE control)? Third, what are the
added beneﬁts of regional implementation of the CDC’s
2012 CRE toolkit (7), and how should the regional interven-
tions be implemented (e.g., at what thresholds should aggres-
sive control measures be employed)?
METHODS
The RHEA model
We used our previously described Regional Healthcare
EcosystemAnalyst (RHEA) software (11) to generate an agent-
based model of CRE for Orange County, California, which
included detailed representations of all 28 acute-care hospitals
serving adult patients (including 5 LTACs) and 74 nursing
homes and the patients moving among these facilities and the
community. We used the Orange County agent-based model
to simulate CRE transmission and evaluate regional interven-
tions. Table 1 shows key model inputs. Our model drew from
detailed 2011–2012 Orange County patient-level data for adult
inpatient hospital and nursing home admissions (12, 13).
Brieﬂy, the model represents each patient with a computa-
tional agent, which on a given day can either carry or not carry
CRE (14). On each simulated day, thousands of these agents
move from the community or other health-care facilities into
the various health-care facilities inOrangeCounty. Eachvirtual
health-care facility has a number of virtual beds, based on its
actual bed count. Acute-care facilities consist ofmultiplewards
(general wards and intensive care units), while nursing homes
consist of a single large ward, representing the high degree of
social interaction among residents. Once a patient is admitted
to a facility, a probability draw determines which of that fa-
cility’s wards/units the patient will enter, and a draw from a
facility and unit-/ward-speciﬁc length-of-stay distribution de-
termines how long the patient will remain in the ward/unit and
facility. CRE carriers draw from a CRE-speciﬁc length-of-stay
distribution (on average, 7.6 days longer than noncarriers) gen-
erated from data on vancomycin-resistant enterococci carriage
in Orange County (12). If transferring directly to an acute-care
hospital, a patient from an LTAC would be admitted to an in-
tensive care unit 50% of the time and a resident from a nursing
home would be admitted to the intensive care unit 20% of the
time (15), to represent patients requiring mechanical ventila-
tion or similar intensive care.
Each day, within each ward/unit, patients mix homoge-
neously, and CRE carriers can transmit CRE to noncarriers,
based on a ward- and facility-speciﬁc transmission coefﬁ-
cient (β): β × susceptible patients × infectious CRE patients.
Once the patient’s stay ends, the patient leaves the facility
and has probabilities of returning to the community, directly
transferring to another Orange County facility, or returning to
the community for a period of time before being readmitted to
the same or another facility. During a nursing home stay, a
resident can experience a brief hospitalization during which
his/her bed is held (i.e., temporary discharge). CRE carriers
had a 1.8-fold increased risk of readmission within 365 days
of discharge. Notably, 8 Orange County nursing homes did
not receive patient transfers from other facilities due to lack
of interfacility transfer (n = 5) or lack of transfer data (n = 3).
CRE spread and control scenarios
Our initial conditions assumed a CRE-naive region (i.e.,
no CRE cases in any health-care facility or among recently
discharged patients) on day 0 and that each nursing home
and LTAC’s transmission coefﬁcient (β) was calibrated to
reach a target prevalence of 25% in LTACs and 8% in nursing
homes 7 years from CRE introduction (year 0). We then pa-
rameterized the intensive care unit and general ward β coef-
ﬁcients, taking Orange County data into account, so that CRE
prevalence trends matched those currently seen in Orange
County facilities based upon epidemiologic surveys con-
ducted in year 4 of CRE emergence (16). This corresponded
to 75% and 50% of the average nursing home β’s for inten-
sive care units and general wards, respectively.
Our initial experimental scenario assumed that no CRE-
speciﬁc control measures were in place—that is, a facility would
detect only those CRE cases incidentally identiﬁed from cultures
obtained for clinical reasons. As a result, only a fraction of CRE
carriers would be detected; we assumed that for every carrier
identiﬁed incidentally through clinical cultures, 8 would remain
undetected. Facilities would place identiﬁed CRE carriers on
contact precautions (i.e., a single room and use of gloves and
gowns by staff). Known carriers would remain on contact pre-
cautions when transferred to other facilities or readmitted to
the same facility. Nursing home residents with CRE infection
(assumed to be 50% of known carriers) were placed in contact
precautions for 10 days. Contact precautions reduced transmis-
sion by 50%, a combination of the efﬁcacy of the intervention
and health-care-worker compliance with the intervention (8).
Other experimental scenarios revolved around the recom-
mendations in the CDC’s 2012 CRE toolkit (7). These con-
trol strategies implement admission surveillance testing for
CRE for patients directly transferred to hospitals or LTACs
from another hospital or nursing home, followed by contact
precautions (single room, staff glove and gown use) for those
testing positive or with a prior history of CRE known to that
institution. Testing consisted of rectal screening with a 1-day
turnaround time, based upon chromogenic testing, with the
test sensitivity and speciﬁcity of testing further adjusted for
the sensitivity of a single rectal swab compared with multiple
or multisite swabs (17–20).
The second experimental scenario represented uncoor-
dinated CRE control, with each individual hospital acting
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Table 1. Key Input Parameters, Values, and Sources Used in the RHEA Model to Simulate the Spread of Carbapenem-Resistant Enterobacteriaceae in Orange County, California
Parameter
Type of Health-Care Facility
Source
(Reference No.)Acute-Care Hospitals Long-Term Acute-Care Hospitals Nursing Homes
Median Range Median Range Median Range
Facility Characteristics
Daily capacitya 125 14–356 69 26–100 97 27–277 12, 13
Annual no. of adult admissions 7,588 779–24,998 1,076 371–2,541 345 35–1,554 12, 13
Mean length of stay, days 5.4 4.2–6.9 25.7 12.3–34.2 107 36–362 12, 13
No. of discharges to community 3,552 277–15,604 350 159–1,785 245 20–1,462 12, 13
No. of direct transfers to hospitals 309 34–1,373 64 1–295 33 23–152 12, 13
No. of direct transfers to nursing homes 931 160–2,253 163 14–449 60 0–480 12, 13
No. of readmissions 1,952 276–6,318 323 186–1,005 318 11–1,317 12, 13
Time to readmission, days 91.6 76.1–104.4 72.4 41.4–113.6 44 1–365 12, 13
No. of temporary discharges to hospitals 65 0–192 13
Length of temporary stay, days 6 0–14 13
CRE Parameters
Targeted point prevalence at year 7 from CRE
emergence in Orange County, %
25 8 23–27
Ratio of carriers to clinical isolates 8:1 8:1 8:1 16, 28, 33b
Transmission coefficient ICUs: 0.00025095 0.00467996 0.00411885–
0.00834316
0.000057895 0–0.00053513 —c
General wards:
0.0001673
Increased risk of readmission for CRE carriers on
discharge, %
80 80 80 22d
Persistent carriers (those who remain colonized), % 30 30 30 34, 35
Loss rate for CRE carriage at 12 months, %e 50 50 50 36
Sensitivity of single rectal swab, % 70 70 17
Screening test sensitivity, % 91 85–92 91 85–92 18–20
Screening test specificity, % 94 89–97 94 89–97 18–20
Test turnaround time, days 1 1 37
Abbreviations: CRE, carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae; ICU, intensive care unit; RHEA, Regional Healthcare Ecosystem Analyst.
a The average daily number of patients in a facility.
b Also personal communication with Dr. Michael Lin (Rush University, Chicago, Illinois) on November 3, 2014.
c Parameterized by model.
d Also personal communication with Dr. Dawn Terashita (Los Angeles County Department of Public Health, Los Angeles, California) on January 12, 2013.
e Assumes a linear loss for the remaining 70% of carriers who experience loss of CRE carriage.
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independently in implementing active CRE surveillance and
contact isolation when the number of CRE cases in that facil-
ity exceeded a certain trigger threshold. This is consistent
with the facility-level recommendations in the CRE toolkit.
The third scenario represented coordinated regional CRE
control in which all hospitals cooperated in a regional CRE
containment approach, implementing active CRE surveil-
lance and contact precautions when CRE appeared in a cer-
tain number of hospitals (i.e., a trigger threshold) in Orange
County. This scenario is consistent with the coordinated re-
gional response recommended in the CRE toolkit.
Model outcomes and sensitivity analyses
Each simulation experiment involved running the Or-
ange County model 50 times, with each run consisting of
1,000 trajectories for 10–15 simulated years to account
for the stochasticity in the model. Reported results are the
mean value, median value, and data distribution from each
experiment.
Sensitivity analyses varied the trigger threshold for each
scenario: for the uncoordinated CRE control scenario, indi-
vidual hospital trigger thresholds of 1, 10, 20, 50, and 100
CRE cases identiﬁed, and for the coordinated regional CRE
control scenario, countywide trigger thresholds of 1, 10, and
20 hospitals detecting a CRE case. Additional scenarios also
explored varying hospital compliance (range, 15%–50% (16))
with implementing uncoordinated CRE control measures
after identifying 10 CRE cases. In each of the aforementioned
experiments, the control policy strategy of interest was in
place from the time of initial CRE emergence, was instituted
as soon as the relevant thresholds were met, and was evalu-
ated over 10 simulated years. An additional set of experiments
evaluated the impact of waiting (e.g., 1 or 3 years) until after
CRE became endemic (simulation year 7) to implement ac-
tive CRE surveillance and subsequent coordinated regional
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Figure 1. Simulated total countywide prevalence of carbapenem-
resistant Enterobacteriaceae (CRE) in Orange County, California,
in a model with no specific CRE control measures, uncoordinated
CRE control measures, and coordinated regional CRE control mea-
sures implemented at trigger thresholds of 1, 10, and 20. The line of
squares represents no specific control measures; black lines repre-
sent uncoordinated control measures at trigger thresholds of 1 (solid
line), 10 (short-dashed line), and 20 (long-dashed line); and gray lines
represent coordinated regional control at trigger thresholds of 1 (solid
line), 10 (short-dashed line), and 20 (long-dashed line).
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Figure 2. Simulated prevalence of carbapenem-resistant Enterobac-
teriaceae (CRE) in Orange County, California, in a model with no spe-
cific CRE control measures, uncoordinated CRE control measures, and
coordinated regional CRE control measures implemented at trigger
thresholds of 1, 10, and 20, by type of health-care facility. A) acute-care
hospitals; B) long-termacute-care hospitals;C) nursing homes. The line
of squares represents no specific control measures; black lines repre-
sent uncoordinated control measures at trigger thresholds of 1 (solid
line), 10 (short-dashed line), and 20 (long-dashed line); and gray lines
represent coordinated regional control at trigger thresholds of 1 (solid
line), 10 (short-dashed line), and 20 (long-dashed line). (Note that
y-axis scales are not the same across panels.)
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CRE control and the 5–7 years following the initiation of
these interventions (i.e., a 15-year total time horizon).
RESULTS
In the absence of speciﬁc CRE control measures, CRE
prevalence reached a countywide average of 11.1% 10 years
after CRE introduction. The line of squares in Figures 1 and 2
shows the estimated CRE prevalence over time in the absence
of speciﬁc CRE control measures. CRE would rapidly spread
throughout the region and reach a prevalence of 3.1% in
acute-care hospitals, 28.9% in LTACs, and 13.9% in nursing
homes in 10 years (Figure 2). Countywide, 16,495 patients
would acquire CRE (both newly acquired and reacquired)
within those 10 years.
Figure 1 shows the OrangeCounty CRE prevalence for each
scenario and trigger (results for triggers greater than 20 are
shown in Web Figure 1, available at http://aje.oxfordjournals.
org/). Coordinated regional approaches were consistently
more effective than uncoordinated approaches. However,
coordinated and uncoordinated approaches yielded similar
results when very low triggers were used (trigger of 1, Fig-
ure 1). As triggers became higher (e.g., allowing formore cases
before implementation of CRE control measures), the advan-
tages of regional approaches grew. For example, uncoordi-
nated approaches with a trigger of 10 cases resulted in a
5.2% countywide CRE prevalence (a 53.0% relative reduc-
tion compared with baseline), while a coordinated approach
with a trigger of 10 hospitals resulted in a 4.1% countywide
CRE prevalence (63.2% relative reduction) at year 10. With a
trigger of 20, uncoordinated and coordinated regional ap-
proaches led to 45% and 55% relative reductions in county-
wide prevalence, respectively, at year 10.
Table 2 shows the number of transmission events averted
countywide over a 10-year period for both approaches as
compared with no CRE control. Over a 5-year period, aggres-
sive control measures (trigger of 1) reduced transmission
events by almost 3,000 cases regardless of a coordinated
(2,976 events) or uncoordinated (2,789 events) approach. A
less aggressive trigger of 10 resulted in 408 more averted
cases using the regional coordinated approach as compared
with the uncoordinated approach. An even less stringent trig-
ger of 20 also resulted in more averted cases (n = 223) using
the regional coordinated approach. LTACs had the greatest
reduction in transmission events, due to their higher CRE
prevalence in our model.
Figure 2 shows CRE prevalence for each facility type.
Both uncoordinated and coordinated regional approaches
showed the greatest beneﬁt in LTACs, followed by nursing
homes. Coordinated regional approaches produced a more
rapid decline in CRE prevalence than did the uncoordinated
strategy. The effect increased with higher trigger thresholds,
especially in LTACs (Figure 2B). Web Table 1 quantiﬁes the
impact of CRE interventions on acute-care hospitals, LTACs,
and nursing homes for each trigger up to 20. Both strategies
generated a statistically signiﬁcant difference in prevalence
from baseline after 2 years with a trigger of either 1 or 10. Strat-
egies with a trigger of 20 required at least 3 years to show a
statistically signiﬁcant difference from baseline.
Compared with a trigger of 1, delaying control until a trig-
ger of 10 was reached resulted in an approximate 30% loss of
effect for uncoordinated strategies and an approximate 20%
loss of effect for coordinated strategies in acute-care hospitals
and LTACs by year 5 (Web Table 1). Reductions in impact for
a trigger of 10 versus a trigger of 1 were even greater (44% for
uncoordinated and 30% for coordinated) for nursing homes.
Delaying until a trigger of 20 was reached resulted in approx-
imately half the effect by year 5 compared with a trigger of 1
(an approximate 50% loss for acute-care hospitals, 40% loss for
LTACs, and a 60% loss for nursing homes via either strategy;
Web Table 1).
Compliance with uncoordinated approaches substantially
affected the beneﬁts of CRE control measures (Figure 3).
The countywide CRE prevalence reached 10.1% at year 10
Table 2. Average Number of CRE Transmission Events Averted Countywide in Orange County, California, Over a
10-Year Period as Compared With No CRE-Specific Control Measures, for Uncoordinated and Coordinated Regional
Approaches Using Trigger Thresholds of 1, 10, and 20
Time Since
CRE Emergence,
years
Type of Approach and Trigger Threshold
Uncoordinated Approaches Coordinated Regional Approaches
1 10 20 1 10 20
1 48 6 1 62 1 1
2 294 121 57 342 115 11
3 815 461 294 905 546 226
4 1,644 1,067 768 1,780 1,298 809
5 2,789 1,953 1,497 2,976 2,361 1,720
6 4,233 3,108 2,473 4,480 3,715 2,914
7 5,951 4,506 3,678 6,268 5,331 4,357
8 7,902 6,107 5,074 8,297 7,168 6,003
9 10,030 7,861 6,616 10,513 9,170 7,804
10 12,283 9,721 8,260 12,862 11,290 9,712
Abbreviation: CRE, carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae.
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when only 15% of hospitals implemented active surveillance
at detection of 10 cases (an 8.8% relative reduction over those
10 years).
Figure 4 shows what would happen if coordinated regional
CRE control measures were not implemented until CRE be-
came endemic in Orange County. If CRE is left unchecked
without speciﬁc control measures, countywide CRE prevalence
reaches 14.9% at year 15. If coordinated regional approaches
are implemented in year 8, the countywide prevalence de-
creases to 9.4% by year 10 but steadily increases to 11.6%
by year 15. If coordinated approaches are delayed until year
10, they have a marginal impact on CRE prevalence (12.2%
at year 15). LTACs experience the most gain with late imple-
mentation, but the levels to which CRE are reduced are not
the same as when implementation occurs before CRE be-
come endemic (approximately 9% vs. approximately 5%;
Figure 4B vs. Figure 2B).
DISCUSSION
Based on the current epidemiologic trends in CRE spread,
our simulation model suggests that without implementation
of CDC-recommended interventions, CRE will continue to
spread among health-care facilities until they become endemic
in Orange County. LTACs, which are well known epidemio-
logically as focal points for concentration of CRE (21–23),
would experience by far the highest increase in prevalence.
Likewise, nursing homes would experience a higher resulting
prevalence, compared with the much smaller increases seen
in hospitals. The effects observed for LTACs are due to their
having greater importation of CRE among admitted patients,
generally higher transmission coefﬁcients (calibrated on the
basis of studies in the literature (23–26)), longer patient
lengths of stay, smaller sizes (e.g., lower bed capacity), and
substantial interconnectivity with other facilities. The effects
in nursing homes are due to their higher transmission coefﬁ-
cients (calibrated on the basis of studies in the literature (27)),
longer lengths of stay, and extensive mixing among patients.
One way of mitigating CRE spread is for each acute-care
hospital and LTAC to initiate CRE screening of all transfer
patients (including resultant contact precautions for carriers)
as soon as the number of CRE cases in that facility exceeds a
certain threshold. The key is to set a low threshold (1, 10, and
20 CRE cases) for implementing control measures. If the
threshold is too high, if the facility does not act quickly
enough, or if the facility is not sufﬁciently compliant in im-
plementing control measures, then CRE spread may not be
adequately abated. Once a sufﬁcient number of CRE cases
are percolating throughout the network of facilities in a re-
gion, control becomes considerably more difﬁcult. A major
drawback of relying on individual facilities to detect cases
and implement measures accordingly is the possibility that
not all facilities would have the same determination of an im-
portant threshold or the same ability to ensure compliance.
For instance, an individual facility might not be able to catch
cases in a timely manner or might not be compliant with im-
plementing control measures.
By comparison, we show that bringing facilities together to
collectively signal the countywide presence of CRE cases
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Figure 3. Simulated impact of hospital compliance with modeled
control measures on the prevalence of carbapenem-resistant Entero-
bacteriaceae (CRE) in Orange County, California, when 15% (solid
black line), 30% (long-dashed black line), 50% (dashed gray line),
and 100% (short-dashed black line) of hospitals implement uncoordi-
nated CRE control measures at a trigger threshold of 10, by type of
health-care facility. A) acute-care hospitals; B) long-term acute-care
hospitals; C) nursing homes. The line of squares represents no spe-
cific control measures, while the solid gray line represents coordinated
regional control at a trigger of 10. (Note that y-axis scales are not the
same across panels.)
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and implement regional control measures can be substantially
be more effective in stemming the spread of CRE. As the
individual trigger for action is raised, the regional impact be-
comes increasingly greater than the sum of its parts. Diffus-
ing the responsibility of detecting CRE cases across facilities
makes it more likely that the CRE’s spread will be detected
earlier and thus contained before percolating extensively
throughout the network. Countywide monitoring gives more
leeway to catch the spread of CRE early. In other words, a
facility does not have to wait until it sees CRE to implement
CRE control measures. Therefore, the countywide triggers do
not have to be as low to still be substantially more effective at
controlling CRE than facilities acting individually. However,
this assumes that hospitals are willing to be responsive to
CRE cases occurring elsewhere in the county.
Coordinating facilities in a region may entail setting up an
information system or implementing other means to facilitate
more rapid communications among facilities and a central-
ized authority (e.g., a local or state public health department)
to initiate and monitor infection control measures. Such a re-
gional approach could have secondary beneﬁts, such as en-
gendering camaraderie among health-care facilities, helping
control other pathogens, and fostering exchange of informa-
tion and experience on disease control. A key consideration is
that the burden of screening would be disproportionately
shouldered by hospitals and LTACs, while the beneﬁt would
be greatest to LTACs and nursing homes. Therefore, coordi-
nating authorities must be sensitive to this dynamic and help
all facilities understand the collective and long-term beneﬁts
of such coordination.
Our results showed that impact of uncoordinated and coor-
dinated regional approaches was, not unexpectedly, greatest
in LTACs. This was probably due to many factors, including
LTACs’ higher prevalence rate based upon epidemiologic
data, the aggressive control measures adopted by hospitals
(including LTACs) as compared with nursing homes, and
the high interconnectedness of LTACs with other facilities
(including frequent patient-sharing with hospitals also imple-
menting controlmeasures). The relativelysmall size ofLTACs
also led to faster relative reductions in prevalence, as 1 fewer
CRE case had a larger effect on the total prevalence.
Our simulation experiments for both uncoordinated and
coordinated approaches modeled highly proactive infection
control strategies.We demonstrated that preventing the spread
of CRE before it fully manifests is much more effective than
waiting for the problem to fully declare itself. Nevertheless,
this requires hospitals to be willing to act before an outbreak
or widespread transmission is noted, which may require a
change of culture for many institutions. Once CRE has be-
come endemic,more aggressive bundled interventionsmaybe
necessary. In a recent study, Hayden et al. (28) determined
that a bundled intervention including high compliance screen-
ing, contact isolation, and decolonization with daily chlor-
hexidine bathing led to statistically signiﬁcant reductions in
Klebsiella pneumoniae carbapenemase-producing Entero-
bacteriaceae acquisition, prevalence, and bloodstream infec-
tions in LTACs.
Our results support the CDC’s efforts to engage local and
state health departments in active strategies focused on con-
trolling the spread of antimicrobial-resistant pathogens (14).
The extensive patient-sharing among health-care facilities in
a region is the basis for the importance of interfacility coop-
eration (8, 29). Now evidence from both simulation modeling
and clinical studies supports cooperation among facilities when
attempting to control the spread ofMRSA (8) and vancomycin-
resistant enterococci (9, 10) in the United States and CRE in
Israel (30, 31).
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Figure 4. Simulated total countywide prevalence of carbapenem-
resistant Enterobacteriaceae (CRE) in Orange County, California, in
a model with no specific CRE control measures and coordinated re-
gional CRE control measures implemented once CRE has become
endemic (years 8 and 10). The line of squares represents no specific
control measures; black lines represent coordinated regional CRE
control implemented in year 8 (dashed line) or year 10 (solid line).
(Note that y-axis scales are not the same across panels.)
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Our study does have limitations. All models are simpliﬁ-
cations of real life (32), and as such they cannot represent
every possible outcome. With our model, we attempted to
portray outcomes that would be reasonably likely if CRE con-
trol strategies were widely adopted across a region. However,
we assumed fairly proactive and aggressive measures. In sev-
eral scenarios, we assumed that all hospitals would reliably
implement CRE control strategies once the triggers had
been reached, presumably in response to a regional public
health request; in reality, individual facilities may not imple-
ment any control strategy, and consistency and sustainability
may be an issue. Our results are also limited by the fact that
the model was tailored to 1 region’s extensive data on patient-
sharing across facilities. To the extent that patient-sharing is
uncommon due to large geographic distances between facil-
ities or insurance restrictions, results may be quite different in
different parts of the country. Moreover, our model assumed
minimal community transmission of CRE and did not in-
clude pediatric facilities, although the literature suggests that
children are less important drivers of the current epidemic.
Finally, our model does not currently provide the necessary
detail with which to evaluate high-risk patient characteristics,
such as the impact of ventilator dependency or other comor-
bidity in driving CRE transmission.
Our study suggests that CRE will become endemic in a re-
gion without adequate interventions. Individual facilities can
substantially reduce the spread of CRE by implementing
the recommendations in the CDC toolkit (7), particularly if
they initiate such control measures before CRE has become
endemic. The most effective strategy may be to employ a
regional coordinated approach in which all facilities imple-
ment the CDC toolkit measures when CRE cases appear in
a threshold number of facilities. This proactive and coordi-
nated approach appears to rapidly conﬁne the spread of CRE.
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